Badiou : Dialectique Affirmative (EN)

Je bouffe du Badiou et du Zizek comme jamais j'en avais eu le courage. Je partage ici du Badiou, une conférence bien touffue, en anglais (désolé), en vidéo, en transcript et en résumé. Sérieux c'est pas trop perché, y a de très belles idées, tentez le coup. Il y parle de démocratie, de dialectique, de nature humaine, de l'Etat, de la tension entre son intérieur et de son extérieur, et de bien d'autres choses.

Le résumé est sous la vidéo.
Le transcript est ici.


Alain Badiou : From Logic to Anthropology, or Affirmative Dialectics'

« (…) After two centuries of successes and dramatic failures in revolutionary politics, and in particular after the dramatic failure of the state form. But we also have to find a new logic, a new philosophical proposition adequate for all forms of creative novelty. (...)
I think the burden today is to find a way of reversing the classical dialectic logic inside itself so that the affirmation, or the positive proposition, comes before the negation instead of after it. My attempt is to find a dialectical framework where something of the future comes before the negative present. (…) 
Certainly revolt and class struggle remain essential—and critique of the past too, like criticism of all forms of artistic creation. All that is a necessity. (…) 
The question is not whether we need to struggle or oppose. Certainly we need. (…) 
I am saying first that to open a new situation, a new possibility, we must have something like a new creativity of time, in time, and a new creativity inside the situation. (…)  
Event is the creation of a new possibility of a new world. In Paris Mai '68 there was an opening for a new possibility of new forms of political action and this is what I call an Event. After that there is the possibility of the materialization of the consequences of this new possibility. (…) 
Naturally, among these consequences there are different forms of negation (we find finally negation): struggle, revolt, a new possibility to be against something, destruction of some part of the law, and so on. But these forms of negation are consequences of the birth of the new subjectivity and not the other way round. (…)
Today ‘democracy’ is really the common term of all the ideological dispositions of the states—of pretty much all the reactionary states in fact. Therefore we must declare our first rupture by saying that we don't accept that sort of ideological line, which ultimately amounts to the idea that one can't resist democracy without being a terrorist or an ally of despotism. How can we do that? How can we really create a new way to critique the false democratic order? (…)
The question is to inscribe democracy in the new affirmative framework. (…)
We can distinguish popular democracy from bourgeois democracy or perhaps to be more contemporary, popular democracy from European democracy. The possibility of that sort of division is also the possibility of thinking democracy as something other than the pure form of state. It is a decision not only between popular democracy and European democracy but between true democracy and democracy as a form of state, as a form of power, as a form of oppressive state or as the form of a class state. All that is the classical discussion. The point is today that this strict duality is not convincing in the framework of a new dialectical thinking. It's too easy to negatively determine the popular democracy as being all that the state democracy is not. To escape that sort of game of negation and negation of negation, I do not present two understandings of democracy—not a division in two, but in three. (…)
For Rancière democracy exists only from time to time. t's not a state of affairs, it's something that happens: we have democracy sometimes, but not very often. It's normal if democracy is the name of an exceptional situation concerning the people. What Rancière says is that this sort of democracy is in fact the activation of the principle of equality. (…)
In the movement of revolutionary rupture we have the true meaning of democracy, mass democracy, but it's not exactly the political concept of democracy. This is why I propose to say that it's much more the historical definition of democracy than it's political definition. (…) 
In the new dialectical framework we must find a third sense of democracy, which is properly the democracy of the determination of the new political subject as such: the new political subject as [in] the consequences of the Event and not only in the Event as such. This is my ultimate conception. Democracy at this level is a name for the elaboration of the consequences of collective action and for determining the new political subject. So we have three terms in appearance: democracy as a form of state (first affirmation), democracy as a mass democracy (second affirmation), and after that we have collective action,. (…) 
But in fact we have four terms finally, because after the classical representative democracy, which is a form of state power; after mass democracy, which is of historical nature; after democracy as a political subject; we have as in Hegel the process of all that returning to the first term—returning to the state. What is the democratic process when it is returning to the first term? It is necessarily the possibility of declining the state itself, as in Marx. It's the possibility—the horizon—of the progressive disappearance of the state as the central necessity, as a form of power. So the fourth term is the first three terms when they return to the first (to the state) in the Communist vision of the vanishing of the state, the historical process of the progressive disappearance of the first term. (…)
Revolution is first the possible destruction of the state of the enemies and after that the creation of a new state or finally the creation of the conditions of the vanishing of the state. (…)
We must affirm that our goal is not by itself the state, the seizing of the state power. We have to be in some sense outside state power (subjectively) but we know that the state is always in the field of political questions, and in the space of action. If our political subjectivity is not inside the state, inside the common law and so on, if to the contrary it is on the outside of the state, [then] the state is nonetheless in the field of every political action today. (…)
We will have to create something, some new form of organization that will be face-to-face with the state; not inside the state but face-to-face with it. (…)
The big difficulty—and it's really the big difficulty in the new dialectical framework—is to maintain the possibility of being outside while prescribing something that concerns the inside. (…)
The problem is simple. For the state—and it's a general law of the power—to be somebody is to be inside the state. Otherwise you cannot be heard at all. How can we be somebody without being on the inside? (…)
If I can organize something outside the state, it's real. It's real to be outside the state. If you are saying that it's not real [then] you are saying that all that is real is only that which is inside the state. That is precisely the return to the old form of political negativity. I know, naturally, that the Event comes first, that the reality of action comes first. Without the French Revolution, without the action of workers; without the real and concrete movement of the Parisian proletariat, Marx certainly would never have created his political concept of proletariat. The movement is not from the concept of proletariat to the proletarian movement—the real becoming is from the revolt of workers to the new proposition (…) 
The real question is whether today the political determination is to be outside or inside the state. The fundamental idea [is that] to be in the new affirmative dialectical framework you must be outside the state. Inside the state you are precisely in the negative figure of opposition. (…)
Capitalist anthropology is the conviction that fundamentally Humanity is nothing else but self-interested animals. It's a very important point (…) 
Modern Capitalism is always speaking of human rights, democracy, freedom and so on, but in fact we can see concretely that under all these names we find nothing else but human animals with interests, who have to be happy with products. We have to search for the Good Life in the big market. What the Capitalist world names ‘subject’ or ‘citizen’ is something like ‘animals in front of the market’ and nothing else. This is really its definition of the Human. It's only with this definition of the human being that Capitalism can work: ‘animals with interests’. (…)
The human being is properly living only when he or she is the agent of the passage from particularity to universality, from local process to genericity, from the singular world to an eternal truth. (…) »